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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how the timing of graduate education affects retention among 
officers in the nuclear community. Officers were divided into four main categories: 
Earned a master’s degree in the first five years of their career, earned a master’s after five 
years of their career, never earned a master’s, and commissioned with a master’s. The 
retention behavior of officers in each of these categories was compared to determine the 
effect on an officer’s decision to remain in the Navy until promoted to CDR. Officers 
who earned their graduate degree in the first five years of their career had a positive 
effect on retention given the officer had attained the rank of Lieutenant Commander or 
had at least been commissioned in the nuclear community for ten years. The cost to send 
an officer to graduate school in the first five years is substantially less than sending him 
later in his career. The scholarship programs that send officers to graduate school early in 
their career make a substantial contribution to the nuclear community and should be 
utilized as a cost effective tool for all officers to earn their graduate degree before their 
Executive Officer sea tour.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the Naval nuclear community, officers must have their master’s degree before they can 
promote to CDR (O-5), which is at approximately 16 years of commissioned service. 
However, this community has a goal for all of its officers to get their master’s before 
their sea tour as an Executive Officer, which is at approximately 12 years of 
commissioned service. This gives the officers in the nuclear community three 
opportunities to earn a master’s degree. First, their opportunity as an Ensign (O-1) is 
possible before submarine officers enter nuclear power school or surface warfare officers 
report to a conventional ship. There are three programs that an officer may participate in 
to earn their master’s at this time: Voluntary Graduate Education Program, Immediate 
Graduate Education Program, and Civilian-Funded Scholarship. The second opportunity 
is as a LT (O-3), and begins during their Junior Officer Shore Tour. An officer may 
participate in one of six programs during this tour to earn their master’s: Burke, Olmsted, 
LEAD, GEV, Officer Scholarship, and a fully funded scholarship to NPS or a civilian 
institute. The third opportunity is afforded when an officer is a LCDR (O-4) during their 
Department Head Shore Tour. An officer may participate in the same programs as those 
of their Junior Officer Shore Tour. Two problems are encountered by the nuclear 
community during the LT and LCDR opportunities when sending its officers to get their 
master’s degrees. First, it costs the Navy substantially more money to send the officers 
later in their career. Second, there are multiple billets that are required to be filled by a 
nuclear-qualified officer during their JO and DH Shore tours. While an officer is 
attending graduate school, the nuclear community maintains three goals for the officers to 
complete: earn a master’s degree, complete Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME), and fulfill the requirements of a subspecialty code.   
The perception exists in the nuclear community that those officers who receive 
their master’s degree as an O-1 are less likely to remain in the nuclear community until 
attaining the rank of O-5. Before responding to this misconception, this thesis provides 
detailed information on the subspecialty code system and how and when officers should 
complete Joint Professional Military Education. This thesis also gives a brief description 
xvi 
of when various graduate programs are available to an officer, what requirements he must 
fulfill to apply, and what service obligations he must commit to upon completion of the 
program.  
Data from the Officer Distribution Information System (ODIS) is used for all 
officers who commission into the nuclear surface warfare and submarine communities. 
The data set contains only information for officers in the nuclear community from year-
group 1983 to year-group 1992. Navy Personnel Command-42 Nuclear Submarines 
provided all of the data for this thesis. This data set is composed of all males because 
women were not allowed to serve in the nuclear community until 1994. All officers 
whose complete careers were as reservists were removed from the data set, leaving the 
final data set at 5,975 observations. Logistic regression was used as the primary statistical 
tool to conduct the analysis. The models found that an officer who attains the rank of 
LCDR and who earned his or her master’s degree in the first five years of his or her 
commissioned career had a higher probability of remaining in the nuclear community 
until CDR over an officer who completed a master’s degree after five years in the Navy. 
The models also found some basic demographic information that improved the chances 
of an officer remaining in the nuclear community until he attained the rank of CDR. If the 
officer attended one of the service academies, he was more likely to remain in the nuclear 
community until CDR. If the officer was not prior enlisted before commissioning, he was 
also more likely to remain in the nuclear community. In addition, an officer who was 
Caucasian, instead of a minority, was more likely to remain in the nuclear community 
until CDR.  
Finally, this thesis broke down each graduate education program and identified 
whether the program met the graduate school requirements for the nuclear community. 
The minimum cost for the Navy to send an officer was based on pay charts from fiscal 
year 2013, as well as data from the Advanced Education and Competency Management 
office which is used for Manpower Management programming to reflect the cost of 
officers in fully funded graduate school programs. All of the graduate programs allowed 
an officer to earn a master’s degree and a subspecialty code. However, only the Naval 
Postgraduate School and Leadership, Education, and Development program (LEAD) 
xvii 
connected with the United States Naval Academy made JPME easily accessible to 
officers. Based on the findings, the Navy saves on average between $50,000 and $70,000 
per year to send an officer to graduate school in the first five years of commissioned 
service compared to what it spends later in his or her career. The Navy spends $180,000 
to $200,000 less for an officer to complete the graduate program as an O-1 compared to 
later in his or her career, because the graduate programs available to O-1s are completed 
in one year while the other graduate programs last for two years and their salary is less as 
an O-1. Part of the reason for a graduate program lasting two years later in an officer’s 
career is due to his or her need to be refreshed on basic skills necessary to complete the 
master’s program. Overall the scholarship programs that send officers to graduate school 
early in their career make a substantial contribution to the nuclear community and should 
be utilized as a cost effective tool for all officers to earn their graduate degree before their 
Executive Officer sea tour.  
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Graduate education is an integral part of an officer’s professional development in 
the United States Navy. According to the Chief of Naval Operations, graduate education 
programs are established in the Navy for three basic reasons. First, they raise professional 
and technical competency while developing the capabilities of military officers so they 
can more effectively perform their required duties and carry out their assigned 
responsibilities. Second, these programs provide developmental incentives for military 
officers with the ability, dedication, and capacity for professional growth. Third, they 
develop and enhance the capacity of the Department of Defense to fulfill present needs, 
anticipated requirements, and future capability (CNO, 1991). 
The goal of the U.S. Navy’s nuclear community is for all officers to receive 
graduate education before becoming an Executive Officer, which is usually at the 12 year 
point. The community sets three objectives for each officer entering graduate school. 
First, the officer must receive a master’s degree in a concentration that is beneficial to the 
Navy. Second, the officer should complete the Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME Phase I and II). Third, officers must receive a sub-specialty code that will allow 
the Navy to fill various shore billets which require a specialized subset of skills. (LCDR 
B. Spillner, personal communication, December 22, 2011) 
Currently multiple opportunities are available for an officer to attend graduate 
school. An officer may obtain their master’s immediately after they graduate from 
college through programs such as Immediate Graduate Education Program (IGEP), 
Voluntary Graduate Education Program (VGEP), and Civilian-Funded Scholarships. 
Another option is to attend the Naval Postgraduate School, attend Distance Learning 
programs, or apply for other programs offered after completing an initial sea tour. These 
sea tours range from three to four years in length. Graduate School is typically 
accomplished on shore duty, which occurs between assignments known as sea tours when 
the officer can be sent out on deployment for months at a time. In the submarine 
community, there are generally two 2-year shore tour opportunities available to the 
officers.  
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The nuclear community faces an additional burden in this regard because there are 
shore billets that must be filled by nuclear trained officers during both windows of 
opportunity available for graduate school. This requirement reduces the opportunity for 
these officers to attend full time graduate education. The Navy must fill the shore billets 
that require nuclear training before detailing officers to graduate school. Due to these 
shore billet requirements and the nuclear community’s retention rates, the community is 
unable to send all of their officers to graduate school before the 12-year mark (LCDR 
Spillner, personal communication, December 21, 2011). 
A. PURPOSE 
During this time of budget cuts, the nuclear community is developing a cost 
effective strategy to meet its graduate education goals. This thesis addresses graduate 
education opportunities available to unrestricted line officers in the submarine and 
nuclear surface warfare communities as well as the cost taken on by the U.S. Navy to 
complete these programs. There is less of an operational and financial loss to send an 
officer who has not earned their warfare pin to graduate school. However, the current 
perception is that an officer who completed graduate school in one of the immediate 
graduate programs is less likely to complete a sea tour as a Commanding Officer 
compared to an officer who attended graduate school after their initial sea tour. This 
study will provide an analysis of the career progression and retention of officers who 
complete their master’s degree immediately following their undergraduate coursework 
compared to the career progression of those who did not. The purpose of this thesis is to 
address the question: Does an officer earning a master’s degree within the first five years 
of receiving his or her commission make him/her more or less likely to promote to O-5 or 
remain in the nuclear community for 16 years or greater? Answering this question will 
give evidence for when the best time that graduate school should be incorporated into an 
officer’s career path in order to provide the greatest potential benefit to the Navy.  
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B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis includes a discussion of graduate education goals for the 
nuclear community with various officers at the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
Management Office in Washington, DC. The data used for this thesis was garnered 
through this office and only contained year groups from 1983 to 1992. The data included 
the officer’s race, if he was previously enlisted, and source of undergraduate education. 
One limitation to this data set is that there were multiple places where an officer’s data 
was not complete in the Officer Distribution Information System (ODIS) file. More detail 
on how this was dealt with for each variable can be found in Chapter IV. Also, due to the 
time frame of the data pulled, there were no females in the nuclear community; therefore 
this study was conducted on males only. The year groups 1993–1995 could have been 
pulled for this study; however, this would only allow for the two initial years with women 
in the study. To answer the primary question of this statistical data, analysis techniques 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the details of the Navy subspecialty 
code, Joint Professional Military Education requirements, and the graduate school 
opportunities available to officers in the nuclear power community. 
A. NAVY SUBSPECIALTY CODE  
The Officer Subspecialty System was developed as a means of defining graduate 
education requirements for the Navy in accordance with DoD Directive 1322.1. The 
Navy Subspecialty Handbook defines a subspecialty as a professional discipline 
secondary to an officer’s primary specialty, or designator, within the Unrestricted Line, 
Restricted Line, and Staff Corps officer communities. An officer must meet a set of 
Education Skill Requirements (ESRs) and Core Skill Requirements (CSRs) through a 
master’s or higher degree program from an institution accredited by an agency 
recognized by the Department of Education in order to gain a subspecialty code. CSRs 
are a set of quantifiable skills, traits, and experiences, for each subspecialty code that an 
individual has received to meet the needs of the Navy. ESRs are the requirements that a 
master’s degree or higher must meet in order to fulfill the CSRs. The subspecialty codes 
are used to facilitate the assignment of officers. A subspecialty-coded billet must have an 
officer assigned to it who has received that subspecialty code. Subspecialty-coded billets 
provide a set of guidelines for types of degrees required through the Navy’s advanced 
education programs. The subspecialty codes an officer has earned can be found in Blocks 
66–68 on the Officer Data Card and the formal education documented in Blocks 54–59.   
To create a new subspecialty code, the Navy has set four guidelines that must be 
followed. First, the requirements necessary to earn the subspecialty code must not be 
overstated. Second, each subspecialty has a pyramidal structure that fosters healthy career 
progression. Third, the subspecialty billets must be distributed throughout the sea and 
shore activities to derive maximum utilization of subspecialist inventory. Fourth, there 
must be at least 15 validated requirements to start a graduate education program to meet 
that subspecialty requirement. The Navy’s tool for establishing the subspecialty 
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requirements is the Total Force Manpower Management System managed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. This system tracks all personnel resources (requirements, 
authorizations, and Fiscal Year Distributive Plan) for active military (officer/enlisted), 
reserve, civilian, contractor, temporary duty, transient, and other military services (The 
Navy Subspecialty Handbook, 2011). 
Officer personnel who attend graduate school full time under any partially or fully 
funded program of 26 weeks or more are considered to be a part of funded graduate 
education. Fully funded education is defined by the Navy to be an officer who receives 
full pay and allowances, with the majority of the tuition and other schooling costs being 
assumed or paid for by the U.S. government or another organization, while pursuing a 
graduate degree. During partially funded education, the officer receives full pay and 
allowances with the majority of the tuition and other schooling costs paid for by the 
officer from his or her own personal funds while pursuing a graduate degree. The officer 
would attend school instead of performing usual military duties through both fully and 
partially funded graduate education. The Department of Defense closely monitors these 
programs to ensure maximum return of investment and retention. All officers who 
receive fully or partially funded graduate education are required to serve in a validated 
position no later than their second shore assignment following completion of that 
education. However, the Immediate Graduate Education Program, described in section E 
of this chapter, begins immediately after commissioning from the USNA or another 
civilian institution and does not have the same additional service obligation requirements.  
B. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME) 
JPME has been embedded into the Professional Military Education (PME) system 
by the Department of Defense and is designed to fulfill the educational requirements for 
joint officer management as mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The JPME 
curriculum is comprised of five different levels designed to progressively develop the 
knowledge, analytical skills, perspectives, and values that are essential for U.S. officers 
to function in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. The 
five levels of JPME include the following: pre-commissioning JPME taught through 
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accession sources, primary level of joint knowledge, JPME Phase I taught at or through 
Service intermediate-level and select senior-level colleges, JPME Phase II taught at Joint 
and Service Senior-level colleges. As of April 2010, all officers are required to complete 
JPME I prior to assuming command. In the nuclear community its goal is for officers to 
complete JPME I while earning a graduate degree. JPME I can also be completed as a 
non-resident through the College of Naval Command and Staff using Distance Learning 
completing Strategy and Policy in 17 weeks, National Security Decision Making in 17 
weeks, and Joint Maritime Operations in 34 weeks, or using the CD-ROM 
Correspondence Course which allows 12 months for completion. JPME I can also be 
taken as a resident at various schools, such as the Intermediate College of Naval Warfare 
in three trimesters in Newport, Rhode Island or at the Naval Postgraduate School in the 
Joint Education Electives Program (JEEP). Officers can also receive JPME I credit after 
the completion as a resident at an international military college that is Combined Joint 
Chiefs of Staff approved. JPME II is a resident education that can be completed at the 
Naval War College, Joint Forces Service College, Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces, and Joint Advanced Warfighting School  (P&R, 2012b). 
C. VOLUNTARY GRADUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM (VGEP) 
The Chief of Naval Operations approved VGEP starting with the class of 1983 
with the intent of accelerating the education of exceptionally capable Midshipmen to 
receive a master’s degree and Navy-approved subspecialty code early in their career. The 
policy regarding this program is outlined in USNAINST 1560.3F. Midshipmen are 
selected for the VGEP program during their junior year and will begin graduate work at a 
university near the Naval Academy during the spring semester of their senior year. Up to 
20 Midshipmen per class can pursue a graduate degree at a local university. The program 
usually takes approximately one year and will be completed by the December after they 
graduate. If a VGEP scholar is selected for the civilian-funded scholarship, they may 
terminate their VGEP at commissioning. In order to be selected for the VGEP program, 
the Midshipman must have a 3.2 GPA, at least a B in Aptitude, and a B in Conduct. At 
the Naval Academy, Midshipmen are given a letter grade A through F in Aptitude and 
Conduct. Aptitude is based off of rankings done each semester by each Midshipman’s 
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Company Officer and peers. A Company Officer is a Lieutenant who is placed in charge 
of the professional development of about 130 to 150 Midshipmen ranging from freshmen 
to seniors. The conduct grade is based on how a Midshipman follows the rules and 
regulations established by the Naval Academy. Midshipmen selected for the nuclear 
power program at USNA accrue a five-year service obligation. VGEP scholars 
accumulate an additional seven month of obligated time in service because they cannot 
begin to pay back their initial service obligation until after they complete the graduate 
education course and check into their following command. During the VGEP program 
the officer will tailor their education plans in order to meet the requirements necessary to 
earn a Navy subspecialty code, but they will not complete any of the JPME requirements.  
D. JUNIOR LINE OFFICER ADVANCED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM 
(NAVY BURKE PROGRAM) 
Fifteen Midshipmen from the Naval Academy and fifteen Midshipmen in the 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) program can be selected for this 
scholarship each year. The individuals selected can be from the aviation, surface, and 
subsurface community and will complete their initial operational tours (about 30 to 36 
months) before starting postgraduate studies. Officers will then receive a graduate degree 
in the field of science or engineering that can be completed within two years. If the 
Midshipman’s desired curriculum is available at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) or 
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), then they cannot attend a civilian institution. 
In order to apply for this scholarship the Midshipman must have at least a 3.2 GPA and 
be academically qualified in the science and engineering fields. On a case by case basis, 
officers may be able to resume studies for a Ph.D. after a follow-on tour based on the 
needs of the Navy (OPNAVINST 1520.18H). 
E. IMMEDIATE GRADUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM (IGEP) 
This scholarship is also known as the Bowman Scholarship, named after Admiral 
Frank Bowman. A designated quota of 14 Midshipmen who have service selected 
submarines or nuclear surface warfare can attend NPS for a master’s program in specified 
technical areas. Current M.S. degrees include Combat Systems, Undersea Warfare, 
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Electrical/Electronic Systems Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and Space Systems 
Engineering. If a Midshipman wants to receive their master’s in an area not listed they 
must submit a special request to the Advance Education Department of the Navy (N15) 
providing evidence of how the degree aligns with the needs of the Navy and how they are 
qualified to complete the master’s program in a year. The newly commissioned Ensign 
must have at least a 3.0 GPA and maintain this GPA throughout their coursework at NPS. 
This will be a full time and fully funded one-year program. However, due to the rigor and 
short duration of this program, students are unable to complete the JPME requirements 
(USNA NOTICE 1520). 
F. CIVILIAN-FUNDED SCHOLARSHIP 
Annually the Navy grants a quota of 20 Midshipmen graduating from USNA that 
can be selected for an immediate civilian-funded scholarship including the Truman, 
United Kingdom, and other international scholarships. The Midshipmen selected are 
generally the top 20 in the graduating class, not including the individuals who are 
commissioned into the Marine Corps. Midshipmen are eligible to apply for a civilian 
scholarship during their junior year at the Academy. This is a partially funded scholarship 
because the Navy will provide 50 percent of the tuition for each Midshipman. The 
remaining 50 percent must be paid for by a scholarship from the desired university or one 
of the following scholarship programs: Rhodes Scholarship, Gates Scholarship, 
Cambridge Scholarship, Marshall Scholarship, Churchill Scholarship, George J. Mitchell 
Scholarship, Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship, William H.G. Fitzgerald Scholarship, 
Thomas G. Pownall Scholarship, John Nolan Scholarship, Otto A. Zipf (Heidelberg) 
Scholarship, Truman Scholarship, Hertz Fellowship, Guggenheim Fellowship, or 21 
other scholarships focused on a specialized area of expertise. The Midshipman must meet 
various requirements to apply for each scholarship and the Naval Academy must 
nominate a Midshipman in order for them to be able to apply for some of the scholarships 
listed (ex: Truman) (USNA NOTICE 1520). 
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G. OLMSTEAD SCHOLARSHIP 
Up to ten Naval Officers, who have completed three to eleven years of 
commissioned service, are selected each year to receive the Olmstead Scholarship. Each 
year a maximum of 25 Midshipmen can be nominated from the graduating class as an 
Olmstead Scholarship candidate. The focus for the Olmstead Scholarship is to study a 
foreign language at a foreign university approved by the Olmstead Foundation and the 
officer’s service community for two years. A Midshipman must have a 3.2 GPA to 
receive a nomination. Other requirements include an aptitude for foreign language, 
success in sports, general adaptability, and will graduate in the Unrestricted Line officer 
community. All Midshipmen nominated must take the Defense Language Aptitude 
Battery and GRE to accompany their nomination. Officers selected for this program will 
receive a M.A, Diplome, License, or other graduate level equivalent in a field of study 
chosen by the scholar with concurrence of their service community. Social sciences, 
political science, and international relations are preferred areas of study; however, the 
service community can assure that the officer receives a graduate degree in a field that 
will receive a Navy subspecialty code. Completion of JPME is not a requirement of this 
scholarship program (USNA NOTICE 1520). 
H. FULLY-FUNDED EDUCATION AT NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
(NPS) AND CIVILIAN INSTITUTES (CIVINS)  
NPS in Monterey, California is the primary source of graduate education to the 
officers in the Navy through the 74 different curriculums that are offered. Officers are 
able to attend the Naval Postgraduate School during a shore tour. In order to qualify for 
NPS, the officer must be academically qualified and possess promotional potential based 
off of Fitness Reports. There are only a set number of quotas available at NPS, based on 
the needs of the Navy. The goal of NPS is to prepare officers to fill sub-specialty 
positions and to reinforce the self-discipline, integrity and intellectual standards of the 
officer corps of the Naval Services. All programs available at NPS meet the specific 
needs of the Navy and cannot be offered at another institution for comparable cost and 
quality. Students at NPS are required to complete at least four credit hours in maritime 
strategy and developments in naval warfare if they are enrolled at NPS for three or more 
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academic quarters. Students who attend NPS under the IGEP program will fulfill this 
requirement by taking one course titled Strategy and War in the JPME I curriculum; 
however, due to time constraints they will not complete all JPME I courses. Students not 
under the IGEP program will fulfill the JPME I requirement by taking three additional 
classes: Joint Maritime Operations (part one), Joint Maritime Operations (part two), and 
Theater Security Decision Making. The curriculum at NPS is reviewed at least once 
every two years by the curriculum sponsor. Fiscal support for NPS is provided by the 
Department of the Navy (SECNAVIST 1524.2B). 
There are 33 other fields that are available for officers to study at over 96 
different civilian institutions nationwide. Each year approximately 22% of the graduate 
assignments for officers are slated to attend civilian institutions (CIVINS). An officer 
who desires to receive fully-funded education at one of these civilian institutions must 
first contact their detailer in order to ensure their eligibility for the program and quota 
availability. The officer must be accepted by the institution before detailers will issue 
orders. An officer is recommended to apply to three different universities that have 
inexpensive tuition rates in order to provide flexibility for budgeting purposes. The 
officer will be reimbursed for three transcript and application fees. An officer attending a 
fully-funded graduate program while on active duty is obligated to serve on active duty 
for a period that is three times the length of the education through the first year and one 
month for each month thereafter. This obligation will be served consecutively with other 
obligated service incurred before entering the graduate program, unless the officer is a 
recipient of a scholarship, grant, or fellowship. In that case, the obligation will be served 
concurrently (OPNAVNOTE1520). 
I. GRADUATE EDUCATION VOUCHER PROGRAM (GEV) 
The purpose of the GEV program is for Unrestricted Line (URL) officers assigned 
to shore duty to obtain a Navy-relevant graduate education in selected areas of study 
during off duty hours. To be eligible for this program an officer must be an O-3 
(including O-3 selects) through O-5 active duty URL officer with demonstrated superior 
performance as a Surface Warfare officer, Submarine Warfare officer, Naval Aviator, 
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Naval Flight officer, Special Warfare officer, or Explosive Ordnance Disposal officer. 
The applicant must be transferring to or currently stationed on shore duty, and must never 
have earned a Navy-sponsored graduate degree previously. The officer will receive an 
additional service obligation using the GEV benefits. After the completion of the 
graduate degree, the officer must remain on active duty for a minimum of two years or a 
period equal to three times the number of months of education up to a maximum of three 
years, whichever is greater. If the officer fails to complete the additional period of active 
duty, they must reimburse the United States for the cost of the graduate education 
received. This program will fund 100 percent of the graduate education cost (tuition, 
textbooks, registration fees, application fees, laboratory fees, computer software 
specifically required on the course syllabus, and any travel mandatory to participate in 
residency programs associated with distance learning) up to $20,000 per fiscal year for 24 
months from time of initial course enrollment, not to exceed $40,000, for the entire 
program. If their program exceeds $40,000 the officer must use personal funds for the 
remainder of the expenses. An officer must earn a graduate degree that meets the 
education core skill requirements to earn at least one Navy subspecialty code at an 
institution accredited by the accrediting agency recognized by the Department of 
Education. Participants must complete their degree within 24 months of the initial course 
convening and maintain a 3.0 average GPA. The officer must begin the program no later 
than the end of the fiscal year for which selected. If operational requirements preclude 
this, a request to delay commencement must be submitted via the member’s 
Commanding Officer prior to the end of the fiscal year (OPNAVINST 1520.37A). 
J. OFFICER SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 
This scholarship program allows selected officers to accept non-Navy funded 
financial aid to enroll in resident graduate education programs on a full-time basis while 
receiving full pay and benefits. The availability of this program is subject to a quota set 
by Navy requirements. This program is similar to the civilian-funded scholarship 
program available for Midshipman from the USNA. An officer can be considered for this 
program based on their career record, promotion potential, needs of the Navy, academic 
qualifications, particular field of study, and availability of funded student billets. At least 
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50 percent of the tuition must be paid by a non-Navy funded scholarship from an eligible 
donor. Selected officers must obtain qualifying scholarships and bear all additional cost 
associated with their academic program. Officers cannot use Tuition Assistance (TA) or 
Graduate Education Voucher (GEV) to augment scholarship funding. The graduate 
degree received under this program must meet all ESRs of a Navy subspecialty code. 
Students under this program will carry a full academic load, which is considered a 
minimum of 12 hours a semester, including summer sessions where they must complete 
six hours. The master’s degree must be completed in 24 months. The minimum service 
obligation for this program is the same as the GEV program. An officer must gain 
admission to a college, obtain a scholarship from an eligible donor, and meet the 
subspecialty code requirements (OPNAVINST 1520.24C). 
K. LEAD PROGRAM 
The LEAD program allows officers to earn a master’s degree in Leadership, 
Education, and Development from the University of Maryland (UMD) and a 4500-series 
subspecialty code. The officer will complete one year of their master’s degree on campus 
at UMD and then serve the following two years as a Company Officer or instructor at 
USNA while taking some classes at USNA. JPME I and an additional master’s degree 
program in National Security and Strategic Studies are available on site for officers who 
are interested. After completing the program, officers are obligated to attend Department 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Four theses written by graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School were used to 
formulate the methodology for this thesis. This chapter will compare and contrast the 
theses completed by these four students to the methods used to complete this thesis. 
A. IMPACT OF GRADUATE EDUCATION ON THE PERFORMANCE AND 
RETENTION OF GENERAL UNRESTRICTED LINE OFFICERS 
   In 1991 LCDR Susan Jordan completed a thesis which focused on Unrestricted 
Line Officers who were qualified Surface Warfare Officers or Surface Warfare Officers 
in the reserves (designator 1100 or 1105) to determine whether or not graduate education 
had any effect on promotion boards. She used logistic regression with the response 
variable focusing on whether the officer left the Navy after LCDR either voluntarily or 
through failing to promote, or if the officer remained in the Navy to promote to 
Commander (CDR). She received her data from the Officer Promotion History File in 
Navy Officer Background Data. This variable is known as PROM.STAT in the ODIS 
system used in this thesis. The data for LCDR Jordan’s thesis were from the Officer 
Promotion History File and Officer Master Record Files maintained at the Defense 
Manpower Data Center in Monterey, CA. She used demographic data such as race, age at 
commission, sex, commissioning source, and marital/dependent status. The educational 
variables she used were undergraduate degree, undergraduate grade-point average, 
mathematical qualification code, graduate education, and graduate school major. Jordan 
concluded that graduate education has a negative impact on retention prior to the LCDR 
promotion boards which occurs after about 10 years of commissioned service. 
B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF EARLY GRADUATE PROGRAMS FOR 
U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY GRADUATES 
In 2003 LT Christopher Milner completed a thesis that focused on retention of 
officers who graduated from the USNA and participated in early graduate education 
programs such as VGEP and Civilian Scholarship Program. He used data from the 
Defense Manpower Data Center through the USNA Office of Institution Research. He 
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focused on retention rates in the surface warfare, submarine, special operations, and 
nuclear surface warfare communities. He added new independent variables to his model 
that were different from Jordan’s, such as whether the Midshipman participated in varsity 
athletics and their overall order of merit from USNA. The basic hypothesis for this thesis 
is that officers who earned a master’s degree through one of the early graduate education 
programs did not attrite at a different level than their peers. Milner goes into an in-depth 
cost analysis comparing the cost of officers in the VGEP and Scholarship programs with 
officers who did not participate. This thesis concluded that the overall populations of 
early graduate education participants are about 26% more likely to remain in the service 
at the six-year point. In the submarine community, early graduate participants were over 
30% more likely to remain in the service at the six-year mark, and nuclear surface 
warfare officers were 45% more likely to remain in the service at the six-year mark. 
However, the results for submarine and nuclear surface warfare officers are flawed 
because all officers who participated in these programs did not begin to pay back their 
service obligation for attending USNA until after they completed their graduate degree, 
and therefore were required to remain in the Navy out of obligation until the six-year 
mark. Therefore, a bias is present in this analysis that makes early graduate participants 
seem more likely to remain in the Navy than in reality. 
C. RETENTION ANALYSIS OF U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY IMMEDIATE 
GRADUATE EDUCATION PARTICIPANTS 
In 2006 LT Maria Navarro expanded upon LT Milner’s thesis and included the 
Midshipmen from the USNA that service selected into the aviation community. She also 
corrected for the fact that the officers who participated in the early graduate programs at 
USNA do not begin to pay back their five-year service obligation until after completion 
of graduate school. Navarro looked at the retention rates from officers in the submarine 
and nuclear surface community after seven, eight, nine, and ten years of commissioned 
service. She also used a binary logistic regression model to complete her analysis with 
the same basic hypothesis as LT Milner. She included a variable to find the effects of 
prior enlistment in her model that LT Milner did not have. Navarro’s thesis concluded 
that submarine officers who participated in an early graduate program had a higher 
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retention rate after seven and nine years of commissioned service, but that there was no 
difference after eight and ten years of commissioned service. She did not break down the 
specifics for the nuclear surface warfare community. However, in general there was no 
difference in retention rates after seven years of commissioned service in her thesis.   
D. ANALYSIS OF PROMOTION RATES TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL 
AND SELECTION FOR COMMAND FOR USMC AVIATION SUPPLY 
AND MAINTENANCE OFFICERS 
In 2011 LtCol Michael Gonzalez completed a thesis that focused on what 
qualities in a Marine Corps Aviation Supply and Maintenance Officer are significant for 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Also, he estimated a logistic regression to determine 
whether a particular MOS provides an advantage for selection to Lieutenant. Chapter VI 
of this thesis provides an organized and in-depth description of logistic regression. 
Although his thesis did not focus on graduate education, a model similar to LtCol 
Gonzalez’s was used to answer the primary question in this thesis.  
E. HOW IS THIS THESIS DIFFERENT? 
This thesis will observe only officers in the nuclear surface warfare or submarine 
community. All of the officers in my data set will start with a designator of 1160 
(Qualified Surface Warfare Officer), 1165 (Qualified Surface Warfare Reservist), 1170 
(Qualified Submarine Officer), and 1175 (Qualified Submarine Reservist). The ODIS 
data source that was used for this thesis did not have some of the demographic 
information available from the Officer Master Record Files such as age at commission, 
mathematical qualification code, and undergraduate grade-point average. The main 
difference from LCDR Jordan’s thesis is that this thesis will focus not only on the 
officers who received a graduate degree, but also when an officer received a degree in his 
or her career. All of the officers in this thesis were able to voluntarily make the decision 
to leave the Navy, because those who were forced to leave the Navy were removed from 
the data set. This thesis concentrates on how the timing of graduate school affects an 
officer’s decision to remain in the Navy, whereas LCDR Jordan emphasized how 
graduate education affects promotion. A primary difference from LT Milner’s thesis is 
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that this thesis will give an overview of all of the graduate programs available to officers 
and give a brief comparison of the service obligations accrued and overall cost of the 
program. The officers observed in the data set used in this thesis did not graduate only 
from USNA. Also, this thesis will control for selection bias using conditioning methods 
unlike previous theses done on the topic of graduate education and retention. To gain 
more information and insight on the history of graduate education, reference LT 
Navarro’s thesis, and to gain insight on modern trends in military education, reference LT 
Milner’s thesis.  
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IV. DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
A. DATA 
The data used for this analysis was pulled by Pers-42N using the Department of 
the Navy’s Online Distribution Information System (ODIS) from the Officer Personnel 
Dictionary File. The data includes all officers in the submarine and nuclear surface 
warfare communities from year group 1983 to 1992. During this time women were not 
allowed in the submarine or nuclear surface warfare community. In 1994 the Naval 
Academy revised the service selection policy and women were allowed, for the first time, 
to select warfare specialties under the same guidance as men. Women were now allowed 
in the nuclear community, with Mary R. Henson being the first female candidate to attend 
nuclear power school. However, females were still not allowed in the submarine 
community until February of 2010, when the Secretary of Defense signed a letter 
notifying Congress that the Submarine Forces were being opened to women. Since the 
data set only extends to officers who were commissioned up to 1992, there are no females 
in this data set. Also, all Personally Identifiable Information such as names or social 
security numbers, have been removed from the data.  
 There were two basic constraints to observe when selecting the year-groups. First, 
the data set begins with 1983 because this is the first year that officers were able to take 
part in the VGEP program. Second, each officer in the data set needs the opportunity to 
be an active duty commissioned officer for 16 years to create an accurate binary response 
variable based on whether an officer remained in the Navy for 16 years and attained the 
rank of O-5. Initially each officer had multiple entries that compounded on one another in 
the ODIS system for each year that they were a member of the U.S. Navy. The data was 
collapsed into one row of information per officer, with a total of 6,999 observations. 
However, all officers whose careers only involved time in the reserves were removed 
from the dataset. These officers could not contribute to the overall goal of each officer 
having a graduate degree before he can be selected for command, because reservists are 
not considered for command. After removing each of the officers who were only 
reservists, the data set consisted of 5,975 data points. 
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 The model was then reduced to 4,979 data points, because all of the officers who 
left the Navy due to misconduct and poor performance were removed from the data set. 
The Loss Code in the ODIS data set identifies the reason an officer left the military. 
Unsatisfactory conduct and unacceptable conduct are two examples of loss codes that 
would not be included in this data set. The only reasons for an officer to leave the Navy 
in this data set are completion of required active service, early release from program 
through voluntary separation incentive, early release from program through special 
separation benefits, and sufficient service for retirement. The officers who remain in the 
data set are officers who were given the opportunity to decide if they were going to 
remain in the Navy as an active duty commissioned officer. All of the individuals who 
were removed from the data set left the Navy as a result of administrative separation, 
court martial, or involuntary discharge.   
  This data is used to answer the primary question: does receiving a graduate degree 
early in an officer’s career affect the officer’s decision to remain in the Navy to screen for 
command and reach the rank of O-5? In order to answer this question, detailed scrubbing 
of each data point was required to calculate how many years of each person’s career were 
spent as an officer, enlisted, or reservist. At all times during an officer’s career he is 
assigned a designator code. This four digit code identifies which community the officer is 
in, whether he is qualified or unqualified, and whether he is active duty or reservist. In 
the data provided, a date is given for each time an officer’s designator changed. You can 
track whether an officer was active duty or a reservist throughout his or her complete 
career through his or her designators. However, there were multiple gaps because of 
insufficient data that is explained in further detail as the variables are broken down in 
section B of this chapter. In the data provided from ODIS, 2% (139) of the officers did 
not have specific dates for the changes in their designator code. However, for these 
officers their first designator code and current designator code were available. Only 2 of 
139 officers had designator codes that indicated they transferred out of the nuclear 
surface warfare or submarine community. Those two officers were deleted from the data 
set leaving a total of 4,977. 
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B. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 The variables chosen replicate previous studies done at NPS on officer retention in 
the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Due to time constraints and lack of data 
received from the ODIS query, there are many variables that should be included in 
future studies on this topic. A list of variables that should be included can be found in 
Chapter VI. 
1. Dependent Variable 
Based on the average submarine officer’s career path, at the 10-year point the 
officer should be a LCDR. In the submarine community at the 14-year mark, an officer 
should have completed his or her Executive Officer (XO) tour and begin screening for 
command during his or her Post XO shore tour. The nuclear community strongly desires 
for all of its officers to have a graduate degree before the 14-year mark. The dependent 
variable for this thesis is binary and states whether an officer earned the rank of CDR. To 
distinguish which officers made the rank of CDR, the variable defined as “highest rank” 
in ODIS was the first place observed to assign a 0 or 1 to each officer. The dependent 
variable has a value of 1 if an officer earned the rank of CDR or higher and 0 otherwise, 
as defined in Table 1. However, in this data set, the highest rank of 69 of the officers (1 
%) is unknown. If the highest rank is not defined in the ODIS system, then an officer 
with a career of 16 years or greater was determined as a success, because this is the 
average point in a submarine officer’s career where he will make O-5.  
Table 1.   Definition of Response Variable 
Variable Label Range 
Response_16 = 1 if remains in the Navy for 16 years or greater and reaches the rank 
of  0–5 ; 0 otherwise 
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2. Explanatory Variables 
The following is a list of potential explanatory variables that were able to be 
gathered using the data received from ODIS. All of these variables will not be used in the 
final model because they distort the pure effect of what will happen if an officer earns his 
or her master’s degree earlier in his or her career. 




 Service Academy 
 Masters 
 Two Masters 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Navy Scholarship 
 All independent variables in the data set were coded against a base officer reference 
group defined as the following: 
 YR 83 
 Not prior enlisted 
 No subspecialty codes earned 
 Caucasian 
 Attended Service Academy 
 Earned a Master after 5 years of active duty service 
 Did not earn two masters. 
 Did not receive a master’s at Naval Postgraduate School 





Data was drawn from the ten-year period 1983–1992. The following nine 
variables placed each officer within their specific year group. Table 2 breaks down how 
the binary variable will be a 1 for the officer’s year-group he promoted with and zero for 
all other year-groups defined in this study. Year-group is the year an officer was 
commissioned into the United States Navy. When an officer screens for command, he 
will be compared to the peers in his year-group. In this thesis, 1983 is the base case that 
all the following years will be compared to.  
Table 2.   Definition of Officer’s Year-group 
Variable Label Range 
YR 84 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 84; 0 otherwise 
YR 85 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 85; 0 otherwise 
YR 86 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 86; 0 otherwise 
YR 87 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 87; 0 otherwise 
YR 88 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 88; 0 otherwise 
YR 89 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 89; 0 otherwise 
YR 90 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 90; 0 otherwise 
YR 91 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 91; 0 otherwise 
YR 92 = 1 if officer was a part of YR 92; 0 otherwise 
 
b. Enlisted 
This value is found by comparing the Active Duty Base Date (ADBD) to 
the Active Commissioning Base Date (ACBD). As seen in Table 3, if an officer’s ADBD 
is greater than his ACBD by two or more years then the officer is placed into the enlisted 
group. Two years is chosen because an individual cannot make it through the 
introductory training and specialty school in a year or less. An individual’s ADBD could 
be greater than his ACBD by less than two years because the officer went through Officer 
Candidate School or another program prior to commissioning. In the data set, 18 of the 
officers did not have an ADBD. These 18 officers were given the enlisted value of 0. 
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Table 3.   Definition of Enlisted Status 
Variable Label Range 
Enlisted = 1 if officers have 2 years or greater enlisted before commissioning; 
0 otherwise 
c. Subspecialty 
As described in Chapter II, a subspecialty code can be earned in graduate 
school, through different jobs and training the officer will receive throughout his career. 
The longer an officer is in the military, the more subspecialties the officer should acquire. 
However, this also may be an indication of the officer’s overall level of effort he is 
willing to put forth to obtain the training and education necessary to meet the Navy’s 
needs. Table 4 shows how this variable is broken down into five subcategories with the 
base case being an officer who has never earned a subspecialty code.   
Table 4.   Definition of Quantity of Subspecialty Codes Earned 
Variable Label Range 
SUBSPEC_1 = 1 if officer has one subspecialty code; 0 otherwise 
SUBSPEC_2 = 1 if officer has two subspecialty codes; 0 otherwise 
SUBSPEC_3 = 1 if officer has three subspecialty codes; 0 otherwise 
SUBSPEC_4 = 1 if officer has four or more subspecialty codes; 0 otherwise 
 
d. Race 
Due to the majority of officers being Caucasian, the officers are separated 
into two distinct groups for analysis purposes. Table 5 shows the break-down of all 
officers in the data set by race. As seen in Table 6 the base case officer is Caucasian since 
5,572 of the 5,977 officers fall into this category and all other officers are considered 
“non-white.” For future studies using data from ODIS, the code for race was changed in 
September 2002.  
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Table 5.   Breakdown of Officers by Race 
Race Number of Officers 
Native American 6 
Asian 114 
Caucasian 5,572 
Native Hawaiian 2 
African American 143 
Other 77 
Declined to Respond 61 
Total 5,975 
Table 6.   Definition of Race 
Variable Label Range 
nonwhite = 1 if the officer is not white; 0 otherwise 
 
e. Service Academy 
There are multiple sources through which an officer may receive his 
commission. This variable captures the effect that a commissioning source may have on 
officer’s decision to remain in the Navy until he is a CDR or for 16 years. Within this 
data set, officers were commissioned through the USNA, United States Air Force 
Academy (USAFA), United States Military Academy (USMA), and the Merchant Marine 
Academy. Officers can also complete Reserve Officer Training Command (ROTC) at a 
civilian institution and attend Officer Candidate School to earn a commission. The data 
does not distinguish an officer’s commissioning source. However, the ODIS system 
provided where each officer received his undergraduate degree. From this information, if 
the officer was commissioned by one of the service academies, he can be distinguished 




Table 7.   Definition of Service Academy 
Variable Label Range 
Service 
Academy 
= 1 if the officer did not attend the USNA, USAFA, USMA, or the 
Merchant Marine Academy; 0 otherwise 
 
f. Master’s  
This variable captures the affect a master’s degree has on whether an 
officer remains in the Navy for 16 years and makes it to O-5. Table 8 shows how the 
variable is broken down into MASTERS_START, which represents officers who had a 
master’s degree before they earned their commission. An officer in the category 
MASTERS_JO earned his master’s degree within the first 4 years of his career as an 
active duty officer. An officer in the category MASTERS_NO never earned a master’s 
degree during his time in the Navy. If an officer is not in the MASTER_JO subgroup then 
he would have had to complete a sea tour and nuclear power school before attending 
graduate school. The base group for this variable is MASTER_SO, which represents 
officers who earns their master’s degree after being in the Navy for at least 5 years.  
Table 8.   Definition of When an Officer Earned a Master’s Degree 
Variable Label Range 
MASTERS_START = 1 if the officer had a master’s degree before being commissioned 
as an officer; 0 otherwise 
MASTERS_JO = 1 if the officer earned a master’s degree within the first five 
years of commissioned service; 0 otherwise 
MASTERS_NO = 1 if the officer did not earn a master’s during his career in the 
Navy ; 0 otherwise 
MASTER_SO =1 if the officer earned a master’s degree after the first five year of 




g. Two Master’s 
The typical officer will obtain one master’s degree. Table 9 shows how 
this variable is defined to capture the effect of multiple master’s degrees. 
Table 9.   Definition for Multiple Master’s 
Variable Label Range 
2_MASTERS = 1 if the officer has two or more graduate degrees; 0 otherwise 
 
h. Naval Postgraduate School  
Table 10 shows a breakdown of whether an officer received his graduate 
degree from the Naval Postgraduate School or a civilian institution. If an officer does not 
fall in one of these two categories then they did not receive a master’s degree during his 
time in the Navy. Table 11 gives a clearer definition of the variable used in the model. 
Table 10.   Breakdown of Graduate Degree Source 
Graduate School Number of Officers 
Naval Postgraduate School 687 
Civilian Institutions 981 
 
Table 11.   Definition of Graduate Degree Source 
Variable Label Range 
MONTEREY = 1 if the officer attended Naval Postgraduate School; 0 otherwise 
 
i. Navy Scholarship 
A total of 1,668 officers in this data set earned a master’s degree and of 
those 836 earned their degrees with the assistance of a Navy sponsored program. Chapter 
II included a brief description of all the graduate programs available to officers in the 
nuclear power community. Table 12 breaks down the binary variable based on if an 
officer received his master’s through a Navy sponsored program or not. A Navy 
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sponsored program means the Navy paid for his tuition, books and fees in addition to his 
monthly stipend.  
Table 12.   Definition of Scholarship Program 
Variable Label Range 
NAVY_SPON = 1 if the officer attended graduate school on a Navy sponsored 
scholarship; 0 otherwise 
  
The ODIS system has an education variable that labels the sponsor for the 
graduate program each officer completed, which is used to define the NAVY_SPON 
variable. The subcategories include: the Burke Scholarship, VGEP, Navy Sponsored 
Scholarship, Advance Education Program, and scholarship programs in the form of 
grants, fellowships, or scholarship received from an outside source. Table 13 shows the 
total number of officers in each graduate program. This variable was not utilized in the 
model because the ODIS system did not label 83% (4,974) officers who earned a 
master’s degree.  
Table 13.   Breakdown of How Officers Earned their Graduate Degree 
Graduate Program Number of Officers Percentage of Total 
Burke Scholarship 9 Less than 1% 
Advanced Education Program 55 0.9% 
VGEP 55 0.9% 
Navy Sponsored Scholarship 836 14% 
Scholarship Program (grants, 
fellowships, and scholarships) 46 0.7% 




There are a total of 9 variables defined for the full model and 4,977 individual 
officers observed. Chapter V discusses the methodology and results of the multivariate 
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V. METHODOLOGY, MODELS, AND RESULTS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
A logistic regression model is used to determine if the nine independent variables 
described in Chapter IV have a statistically significant influence on an officer’s decision 
and ability to remain in the Navy until attaining the rank of CDR or completing at least 
16 years of active duty service. The logistic regression model is used because the 
dependent variable is dichotomous and fulfills the desirable properties outlined by 
Hosmer and Lemeshow. According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) a logistic 
regression is useful when the dependent variable has many desirable properties: its 
parameters are linear, may be continuous, and may range from negative to positive 
infinity depending on the range of x. (p. 6) To estimate the parameters for the 
independent variables, the method of maximum likelihood is used in JMP Pro 9, a 
statistical software package. The parameter is considered significant if its p-value is 
greater than 0.05. To gain a more complete understanding of the properties of a logistic 
regression, see Hosmer and Lemeshow’s Applied Logistic Regression, second edition 
(2000).  
To select which variables to include in the final model, a step-wise regression 
using backward selection method and minimizing Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) 
within JMP was utilized. According to David Beal (2012), the model with the smallest 
AIC is the best because it minimizes the difference from the given model to the “true” 
model. Another statistical test used is the chi-square test, to determine if the fitted model 
with additional variables is better than a model that includes only the intercept. A p-value 
of 0.05 also serves as a gauge for the chi-square test.  
JMP provides a summary of fit for each model. The summary of fit includes R2, 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Mean of Response, and total number of observations. 
The best model will have an R2 close to 1.0, meaning that the majority of the variation 
around the mean can be attributed to the model rather than random error. The Root Mean 
Square Error reveals what percentage of the variability is unexplained, and the mean of 
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response is the overall mean of the response values for the base model which all the other 
models are compared to. These tests will measure the accuracy of the different models. 
B. THE MODELS AND RESULTS  
Two different logistic regression models were built to answer the primary 
question: Does earning a master’s degree in the first five years as a commissioned officer 
increase the likelihood he/she promotes to O-5 or at least remains in the community for 
16 years? There is an empirical problem with estimating this model due to the selection 
bias caused by use of graduate school as a retention tool in the military. When all of the 
data points are used in the model there is an unrealistic level of statistical significance for 
officer who received his masters after five years of commissioned service. This level of 
significance is unrealistic because all officers who earn their degree later in their career 
are required to remain in the Navy for at least ten years. This accounts for them starting 
their masters after five years of commissioned service, going to graduate school for two 
years and serving three years of payback time, therefore these officers do not make the 
same choice to remain in the Navy as those who attended graduate school early in their 
career until after ten years of commission service. To fix this issue I used two 
approaches, which were very similar. The first approach is to condition the data on the 
fact that every officer in the data set has been commissioned for at least 10 years. 
Eliminating officers commissioned for less than 10 years limits the data set used for the 
first model to a total of 1,895 data points. The second approach conditions on the data on 
the fact that every officer in the data must have at least attained the rank of LCDR (O-4). 
There are a total of 1,839 data points in the second model after eliminating all of the 
officers who do not reach the rank of LCDR. 
Tables 14 and 15 give a clearer depiction of why the two models must be 
conditioned on ten years of commissioned service and attaining the rank of LCDR to fix 
the problem of selection bias. Table 14 breaks down the percentage of officers who 
remained in the nuclear community after 7, 10, 12, 14, and 16 years of commissioned 
service. This table encapsulates the complete data set prior to any condition applied to 
control for selection bias, however all officers whose complete career was served in the 
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reserves have been removed. Table 15 displays 12, 14 and 16 YCS because the majority 
of officers must remain in the Navy for at least 12 years before completing their second 
shore tour. The data used for Table 15 has been conditioned on the fact that every officer 
has attained the rank of LCDR. In Table 14 there is a drastic difference in percentage 
values for officers who earned their master’s degree in the first five years versus after 
five years; however, there is very little differences in the percentage values for these two 
columns in Table 15.   The difference in these two tables is due primarily to the selection 
bias present in Table 14. Most of the officers that make up the data set for Table 14 
would never make it to 10, 12, 14 or 16 YCS because they chose to get out after their 
initial obligation. Officers who earn their masters after five years are obligated to remain 
in the military for at least 8 years, therefore Table 14 gives a false sense that officers who 
receive their masters after five years are more likely to remain in the Navy than officers 
who earned their masters prior to five years of commissioned service. Table 15 corrects 
for this using conditioning, and focuses only on those officers that have made it to the 
rank of LCDR. 









YCS 7 44.1% 58.8% 98.9% 40.0% 
YCS 10 30.8% 23.5% 97.3% 16.3% 
YCS12 26.4% 23.5% 92.4% 13.5% 
YCS14 23.5% 23.5% 81.9% 11.3% 
YCS 16 23.5% 23.5% 79.8% 10.0% 
Table 15.   Nuclear Officer Retention Based on Timing of Graduate Education and 










YCS12 72.4% 94.2% 97.9% 92.1% 
YCS14 72.4% 86.9% 92.7% 82.7% 
YCS 16 72.4% 85.5% 86.0% 73.7% 
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The base logistic regression model shown in Figure 1 does not include any 
information about education. Parameters will be added to determine how graduate 
education affects the likelihood an officer attains the rank of CDR.  
 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ:ܹ݈݈݅	ܽ݊	݋݂݂݅ܿ݁ݎ	ݎ݁݉ܽ݅݊	݅݊	ݐ݄݁	ܰܽݒݕ	ݑ݊ݐ݈݅	݄݁	ܽݐݐܽ݅݊ݏ	ܥܦܴ
ൌ 	ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚	ࢄࢅࡾૡ૝ ൅ ࢼ૛ࢄࢅࡾૡ૞ ൅ ࢼ૜	ࢄࢅࡾૡ૟ ൅ ࢼ૝	ࢄࢅࡾૡૠ ൅ ࢼ૞ࢄࢅࡾૡૡ
൅ ࢼ૟	ࢄࢅࡾૡૢ ൅ ࢼૠ	ࢄࢅࡾૢ૙ ൅ ࢼૡ	ࢄࢅࡾૢ૚ ൅ ࢼૢ	ࢄࢅࡾૢ૛ ൅ ൅ࢼ૚૙	ࢄࡿࢁ࡮ࡿࡼࡱ࡯_૚
൅ ࢼ૚૚	ࢄࡿࢁ࡮ࡿࡼࡱ࡯_૛ ൅ ࢼ૚૛	ࢄࡿࢁ࡮ࡿࡼࡱ࡯_૜ ൅ ࢼ૚૜	ࢄࡿࢁ࡮ࡿࡼࡱ࡯_૝ ൅ ࢼ૚૝	ࢄࡱ࢔࢒࢏࢙࢚ࢋࢊ
൅ ࢼ૚૞	ࢄ࢔࢕࢔࢝ࢎ࢏࢚ࢋ 
Figure 1.  Base Logistic Regression Model   
1. Conditioned on Ten Years of Commissioned Service 
A backward step-wise selection in JMP minimizing the AIC value was 
used to select the best education variables to add to the model conditioned on the fact that 
every officer had at least 10 years of commissioned service (TEN model). In order to test 
if sending an officer to graduate school earlier or later in his career will make him more 
or likely to remain in the Navy until O-5, the variables MASTER_SO and MASTER_JO 
were included in the TEN model. However, MASTER_JO was not selected by JMP to be 
in the model during the step-wise selection process. Also, the variables SUB_1 and 
SUB_2 were not selected.   The model created using step-wise selection gave a starting 
point to see which variables must be added to the base model. The step-wise model is not 
the final model used because upon further investigation it became evident that the 
variables MONTEREY, NAVY_SPON and 2_MASTERS that were selected to be added 
to the base model by JMP should not be included because they capture some of the effect 
MASTER_JO and MASTER_SO have on the response variable. To capture the pure 
effect of what will happen if an officer earns his master’s degree earlier in his career, the 
variables MONTEREY, NAVY_SPON and 2_MASTER must be eliminated from the 
final model. NAVY_SPON distorts the pure effect because an officer who earns a 
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masters after at least five years of active duty commissioned service is more likely to be 
in a Navy sponsored program and/or attend the Naval Postgraduate School than those 
who earned their masters in the first five years of commissioned service or before they 
were commissioned. Table 16 estimates the parameters for the model including all of the 
education variables given a total of 1,895 observations. 
Table 16.   Parameter Estimates:  Effect of Various Factors on whether an Officer  
Remains in the Navy until Promoted to O-5 (Conditioned on Ten Years of 
Commissioned Service with 1,895 observations)  
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Odds Ratio p-value
Intercept -3.329 0.629 28.00 0.036 <.0001*
Timing of Master’s Degree (reference: earned after 5 years) 
before commissioned -0.405 0.186 4.71 0.667  0.029* 
first 5 years 0.206 0.203 1.03 1.229 0.309 
Never  -0.364 0.067 29.68 0.695 <.0001*
Year-group (reference: 1983) 
Year-group 1984 0.177 0.106 2.80 1.194 0.094 
Year-group 1985 0.445 0.111 16.07 1.560 <.0001*
Year-group 1986 0.499 0.115 18.70 1.647 <.0001*
Year-group 1987 0.339 0.110 9.45 1.404 0.002* 
Year-group 1988 0.271 0.103 6.80 1.311 0.009* 
Year-group 1989 0.35 0.113 9.80 1.419 0.001* 
Year-group 1990 0.338 0.106 10.17 1.402 0.001* 
Year-group 1991 0.464 0.113 16.96 1.590 <.0001*
Year-group 1992 0.578 0.113 26.27 1.782 <.0001*
Subspecialty (reference: never earned a subspecialty) 
One subspecialty -0.053 0.102 0.27 0.948 0.605 
Two subspecialties -0.049 0.112 0.20 0.952 0.654 
Three subspecialties 0.188 0.120 2.47 1.207 0.115 
Four or more 
subspecialties 
0.553 0.133 17.20 1.738 <.0001*
Demographics 
Did not attend service 
academy 
-0.241 0.060 15.78 0.786 <.0001*
Greater than two 
years enlisted 
-0.441 0.063 47.70 0.643 <.0001*




The ten years model used to answer this thesis primary question included all of 
the variables listed above. The Prob>ChiSq value of less than .001 in Table 17 gives 
evidence that the model with all of the additional education variables added better 
explains the response variable than the model with only the intercept. The RMSE value 
of 0.4453 can be interpreted as 44.53% of the variability is unexplained in this model. 
The model has a misclassification rate of 0.3077, which means that the model accurately 
classifies officers 70% of the time as either staying in the Navy until O-5 or not 
remaining in the Navy until O-5. The Prob>ChiSq value, shown under Lack of Fit, 
suggest that additional terms need to be added to the full model in order to explain the 
variability in the response variable. 
Table 17.   The Whole Model Test for TEN YEAR Model 
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a. Interpreting the Results 
The most important finding in this model is that sending an officer to get 
his master’s degree in the first five years of his career has no significant effect on whether 
the officer will attain the rank of CDR. A key demographic result from this regression is 
extremely low p-values for officers who attended one of the service academies and for 
officers who had greater than two years of prior enlisted service. The p-values for both of 
these variables are less than 0.001, which indicates that these are both significant 
variables in the model. Both variables had an odds ratio of less than one, which can be 
interpreted as individuals who did not attend one of the service academies and officers 
who had less than two years of prior enlisted service are more likely to remain in the 
nuclear community until reaching the rank of CDR. Also a p-value of less than 0.001 
gives evidence that the more subspecialties an officer earns the more likely he is to 
remain in the Navy until O-5. This finding could be because an officer with a high 
number of subspecialties would more likely have had to have more time in service. 
However, if a junior officer has earned a high number of subspecialties he may be a good 
candidate to send to graduate school because he is aware and motivated to meet the needs 
of the Navy. It would be very valuable to include more variables that explain the 
demographics of each officer in order to find commonality among the officers who 
remain in the nuclear community until they reach the rank of CDR. The demographics 
that these officers share would target what kind of officers the Navy should focus on 
sending to graduate school because they are more likely to remain in the Navy as an 
active duty nuclear officer until they reach the rank of CDR. 
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Table 18.   Interpretation of Estimate Coefficients with  
Significance in the Ten-year Model 
Term Estimate Odds Ratio Interpretation 
Joined the 




An officer who earned his master’s degree 
before they were commissioned is associated 
with lower odds of staying in the Navy until 
O-5, relative to an officer who earned their 





An officer who never earned his master’s 
degree is associated with lower odds of 
staying in the Navy until O-5, relative to an 
officer who earned their master’s degree 





An officer who did not go to one of the 
service academies is associated with lower 
odds of staying in the Navy until O-5, 
relative to an officer who attended a service 
academy. 
Prior enlisted -0.441 0.643 
An officer who spent greater than 2 years 
enlisted is associated with lower odds of 
staying in the Navy until O-5, relative to an 






An officer who has earned four or more 
subspecialty code is associated with higher 
odds of staying in the Navy until O-5, 
relative to an officer with three or fewer. 
Year-group 
1985 0.445 1.560 
An officer who was commissioned in 1985 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1986 0.499 1.647 
An officer who was commissioned in 1986 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1987 0.339 1.404 
An officer who was commissioned in 1987 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1988 0.271 1.311 
An officer who was commissioned in 1988 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1989 0.35 1.419 
An officer who was commissioned in 1989 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
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Term Estimate Odds Ratio Interpretation 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1990 0.338 1.402 
An officer who was commissioned in 1990 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1991 0.464 1.590 
An officer who was commissioned in 1991 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1992 0.578 1.782 
An officer who was commissioned in 1992 is 
associated with higher odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5.1983, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
 
2. Conditioned on Obtaining the Rank of LCDR 
A backward step-wise selection in JMP minimizing the AIC value was also used 
to select the best education variables to add to the model condition on the fact that every 
officer attained the rank of LCDR (LCDR model). The LCDR model is set up exactly the 
same as the TEN YEAR model, however there are 56 less observations because those 56 
individuals completed ten years of service but never attained the rank of LCDR. The 
importance of comparing the TEN YEAR model and the LCDR model is to observe how 
the removal of 56 individuals can alters the significance of each variable. The variables 
relevant to when an individual received a masters are of particular importance because 
the significance level increases in the LCDR model is greater than in the TEN YEAR 
model.   
After completing the step-wise selection the only variables not selected were 
SUB_1, SUB_2, and YR84. However, these variables will be used in the final model. 
The variables MONTEREY, NAVY_SPON, and 2_MASTERS are eliminated to 
maintain the pure effect of the variables that pertain to the main question asked by this 
thesis MASTER_START, MASTER_JO, and MASTER_NO. The three variables are 
eliminated for the same reason they were eliminated in the model conditioned on ten 
years of active duty commissioned service. Table 19 estimates the parameters for the 
LCDR model with all of the education variables given a total of 1,839 observations. 
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Table 19.   Parameter Estimates: Effect of Various Factors on whether an Officer Remains in 
the Navy until Promoted to O-5  (Conditioned on Attained Rank Greater than 
LCDR (O-4) with 1,839 Observations) 
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Odds Ratio p-value 
Intercept -2.62 0.707 13.71 0.073 0.0002* 
Timing of Master’s degree (reference: earned after 5 years) 
before commissioned -0.414 0.202 4.17 0.661 0.041* 
first 5 years 0.430 0.211 4.15 1.537 0.041* 
Never -0.299 0.068 19.24 0.742 <.0001* 
Year-group (reference: YR83) 
YR84 0.095 0.111 0.75 1.100 0.387 
YR85 0.292 0.112 6.72 1.339 0.009* 
YR86 0.372 0.118 9.80 1.451 0.001* 
YR87 0.233 0.114 4.15 1.262 0.041* 
YR88 0.182 0.108 2.82 1.200 0.092 
YR89 0.246 0.117 4.41 1.279 0.035* 
YR90 0.213 0.109 3.80 1.237 0.051 
YR91 0.344 0.115 8.84 1.411 0.003* 
YR92 0.419 0.114 13.34 1.520 0.0003* 
Subspecialty (reference: never earned a subspecialty) 
One subspecialty -0.073 0.105 0.48 0.930 0.486 
Two subspecialties -0.065 0.115 0.32 0.937 0.571 
Three subspecialties 0.151 0.123 1.51 1.163 0.219 
Four or more 
subspecialties 
0.493 0.135 13.18 1.637 0.0003* 
Demographics 
Did not attend service 
academy 
-0.234 0.062 14.32 0.791 0.0002* 
Greater than two 
years enlisted 
-0.395 0.064 37.32 0.674 <.0001* 
Not Caucasian -0.232 0.081 8.07 0.793 0.004* 
 
The final model used to answer the questions in this thesis included all of the 
variables listed above. Table 20 shows that the model with all of the additional education 
variables added is better than the model fitted with only the intercept because the 
Prob>ChiSq located under Whole Model Test is significant with a p-value of less than 
.001. The R2 value is 0.0961 and the RMSE is 0.4447, which can be interpreted as 
44.47% of the variability is unexplained in this model. The model has a misclassification 
rate of 0.3094, which shows that the model accurately classifies officers 70% of the time 
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as either staying in the Navy until CDR or not remaining in the Navy until CDR. For 
goodness of fit, shown under the Lack of Fit section, the p-value of 0.0027 is less than 
0.05 and therefore significant. This low p-value is interpreted as additional terms need to 
be added to the model in order to explain the variability in the response variable which 
indicates whether an officer attains the rank of CDR or not.  
Table 20.   The Whole Model Test for LCDR Model 
 
a. Interpreting the Results 
This model is extremely important because it gives evidence that an 
officer who gets his master’s in the first five years of his career is more likely to remain 
in the Navy until CDR than an officer who gets his master’s degree after five years of 
active duty commissioned service. This finding is supported by the p-value, found in 
Table 19, for an officer earning a master’s degree in the first five years of his career is 
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0.041. Table 21 provides more findings that explain the potential effects of when an 
officer receives his masters may have on his career. This model also gives insight on the 
types of demographics that are more likely to remain in the Navy until O-5, because all 
three demographic variables have a p-value of less than 0.05. The three variables also 
have an odds ratio of less than one, which can be interpreted as an officer who went to 
one of the service academies are less likely to remain in the nuclear community until O-5 
then those who did not. Also, officers who have more than two years of enlisted service 
are less likely to remain in the nuclear community until O-5 then officers who were prior 
enlisted. Finally officers who are minorities are less likely to remain in the nuclear 
community until O-5 then officers who are Caucasian. Table 21 describes in detail all of 
the variables that had a p-value that was less than 0.05 in the model.   
Table 21.   Interpretation of Estimate Coefficients with  
Significance in the LCDR Model 





An officer who did not go to one of the 
service academies is associated with lower 
odds of staying in the Navy until O-5, 
relative to an officer who attended a service 
academy. 
Prior 
enlisted -0.395 0.674 
An officer who spent greater than 2 years 
enlisted is associated with lower odds of 
staying in the Navy until O-5, relative to an 
officer without prior enlisted service. 
Non-white -0.232 0.793 
An officer who is not white is associated 
with lower odds of staying in the Navy 






An officer who earned his master’s degree 
before they were commissioned is 
associated with lower odds of staying in the 
Navy until O-5, relative to an officer who 








An officer who earned his master’s degree 
within the first 5 years commissioned in the 
Navy is associated with higher odds of 
staying in the Navy until O-5, relative to an 
officer who earned their master’s degree 
after five years of service. 
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An officer who never earned his master’s 
degree is associated with lower odds of 
staying in the Navy until O-5, relative to an 
officer who earned their master’s degree 






An officer who has earned four or more 
subspecialty codes is associated with 
higher odds of staying in the Navy until O-
5, relative to an officer with three or fewer. 
Year-group 
1985 0.292 1.339 
An officer who was commissioned in 1985 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1986 0.372 1.451 
An officer who was commissioned in 1986 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1987 0.233 1.262 
An officer who was commissioned in 1987 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1988 0.182 1.200 
An officer who was commissioned in 1988 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1989 0.246 1.279 
An officer who was commissioned in 1989 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1990 0.213 1.237 
An officer who was commissioned in 1990 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1991 0.344 1.411 
An officer who was commissioned in 1991 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
Year-group 
1992 0.419 1.520 
An officer who was commissioned in 1992 
is associated with higher odds of staying in 
the Navy until O-5, relative to an officer 
commissioned in 1983. 
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b. Officers Removed in LCDR Model 
The model conditioned on whether an officer earns the rank of LCDR 
gives reason to believe that if an officer earns the rank of LCDR, then those who received 
his master’s in the first five years of his career are more likely to promote to CDR  than 
one who receive his master’s after the first five years of his career. However, this section 
will focus on the officers who were removed from the LCDR model to control for 
selection bias. All officers whose complete career was served as a reservist are removed 
from the data set used in Tables 22 through 27. Table 22 places the officers who never 
achieved the rank of LCDR into groups based on their total years of active duty 
commissioned service (YCS) and then breaks them down further by when in their career 
they earned a master’s degree. This is done to find common trends in this subgroup of 
data and lend a better understanding of the data used to create Tables 23 through 27. The 
reason to focus on the officers removed from the LCDR model is to help provide insight 
for future studies to better understand if there is a benefit to sending an officer earlier or 
later in his career to earn his master’s.  
 In Table 22 the column labeled “Total” captures how many officers within this 
subgroup left the Navy with the total years of commissioned service found in the column 
labeled YCS. In the column titled “Chose to leave the Navy” the officers are narrowed 
down to only those who left the Navy voluntarily by fulfilling their service obligation, 
transferring to another branch of service, or accepting an incentive due to the Navy 
downsizing. The officers who fall into the category of voluntarily leaving the Navy are 
placed in groups based on when they earned their master’s degree during their career. 
The main focus in this section is to find trends or values that standout based on how an 
officer earned a master’s degree and whether he was forced or volunteered to leave the 
Navy. An important take away from Table 22 is that all of the officers who earned their 
master’s degree in the first five years voluntarily left the Navy after no more than 10 
YCS. This takeaway is important to find why 10 YCS is a critical breaking point for 
officers who earned their master’s degree in the first five years to leave the Navy. Further 
analysis on this subgroup with more descriptive personal information such as number of 
dependents, health issues, total number of days out to sea, and overall job satisfaction 
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could help determine what role earning a master’s early in an officers career plays in his 
decision to leave the Navy or if there is an another critical factor that contributes to this 
breakdown.  
Table 22.   Total Years of Commissioned Service for Officers  






















< 5 2,132 34 9 3 2,086 2,326 
6 356 10 3 3 340 373 
7 603 6 13 10 574 617 
8 384 3 24 9 348 399 
9 85 2 3 1 79 97 
10 48 1 5 8 34 65 
11 20 1 0 5 14 82 
12 13 0 0 9 4 66 
13 4 0 0 3 1 9 
14 1 0 0 0 1 1 
15 2 0 0 1 1 2 
Total 3,648 57 57 52 3,482 4,037 
 
Table 23 looks at each column individually, and takes the number of officers who 
chose to leave in a particular YCS and divides it by the value for that same column found 
in the row labeled Total in Table 22. For example, in Table 23 the bolded value 16%, in 
the column labeled earned master’s in first five years and row < 5 YCS, states that 16% 
of the officers who did not make LCDR and earned their master’s in the first five years of 
their career voluntarily left the Navy with less than five years of commissioned service. 
Table 23 gives an easier visualization of when officers in each subgroup are more likely 
to leave the Navy. The majority of officers who earn their masters in the first five years 
leave after 8 years of commissioned service. This finding is important, especially for   
officers who attended graduate school in the first five years of their career, because this is 
when an officer will have to choose to sign on for more sea time to voluntarily separate. 
This may be a point where an officer who already has earned a master’s degree could be 
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incentivized to remain in the Navy. This point will be further expanded upon in Section C 
of Chapter V. 
Table 23.   Percentage of Officers Who Left the Navy Based on YCS and  
Master’s Degree  
YCS 




















< 5 58% 60% 16% 6% 60% 58% 
6 10% 18% 5% 6% 11% 9% 
7 17% 11% 23% 19% 16% 15% 
8 11% 5% 42% 17% 10% 10% 
9 2% 4% 5% 2% 2% 2% 
10 1% 2% 9% 15% 1% 2% 
11 1% 2% 0% 10% 0% 2% 
12 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 2% 
13 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 
14 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
15 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 
 
Table 24 breaks down all of the officers into whether they were forced or 
volunteered to leave the Navy based on when they earned their master’s degree. The 
important takeaway from Table 24 is that those officers who were sent to graduate school 
early volunteer to leave at a dramatically higher rate, relative to those who obtain their 
degree later in their careers. This is another important reason for further study to focus on 
what is causing these officers to voluntarily leave the Navy. It cannot be concluded that it 




Table 24.   Number of Officers Forced and Volunteered to Leave the Navy  
Before Becoming a LCDR 
How officer 


















Forced 2 6 52 3,484 3,544 
Volunteered 58 57 67 309 491 
Total 60 63 119 3,793 4,035 
Percentage 
Forced 3% 10% 44% 92% 88% 
Percentage 
Volunteered 97% 90% 56% 8% 12% 
  
Table 24 looks only at the officers who were removed from the LCDR model. Table 25 
expands the data set to include the officers who made it to LCDR and removes all of the 
officers who did not have a code for how they left the Navy in the ODIS system. Table 
25 focuses only on officers who received their master’s degree during their career in the 
Navy to view any trends present when the data set expanded to the entire data set. Table 
25 shows that the percentage of officers who are forced to leave the Navy decreases from 
Table 24 for all officers regardless of when they earned their master’s degree.  
Table 25.   Breakdown of Officers Who Were Forced and Volunteered  
to Leave the Navy with Complete Data Set 
How officer left Navy Earned master’s after five years 
Earned master’s before 
five years 
Volunteered 701 84% 93 92% 
Forced 139 17% 8 8% 
Total (Overall total = 4,975) 840 17% 101 2% 
  
Tables 26 and 27 take the percentages presented in Table 25 to see how many of the 
officers made it to CDR before they volunteered or were forced to leave. Table 26 shows 
that the majority of officers who earn a master’s degree in the first five years leave 
voluntarily before they make it to CDR. However, only a slight majority of officers who 
 48
earn their master’s Degree after five years make it to CDR. Tables 26 and 27 are 
important to see how the subgroup in Table 24 does not completely represent the entire 
group of observations. 
Table 26.   Percentage of Officers Who Received their Master’s in the First Five Years Who 
were Promoted to CDR 
Made it to CDR? Volunteered to Leave Forced to Leave 
Yes 22% 1% 
No 70% 7% 
Table 27.   Percentage of Officers Who Received their Master’s After Five Years Who Were 
Promoted to CDR 
Made it to CDR? Volunteered to Leave Forced to Leave 
Yes 43% 5% 
No 41% 12% 
 
C. GRADUATE EDUCATION COST 
 Figure 1 shows the basic career progression for an officer in the submarine 
community. Within a submarine officer’s career there are two windows of opportunity 
for an officer to attend graduate school in the submarine warfare community if he does 
not go before nuclear power school. The first window of opportunity to attend graduate 
school is known as the Post Junior Officer Shore Tour which hits after approximately five 
years of active duty commissioned service. The second window of opportunity is known 
as the Post Department Head Shore Tour which falls in an officer’s career path after at 
least ten years of active duty commissioned service. If an officer attends graduate school 
during the Post JO Shore Tour, then he will be attending graduate school as an O-3 and if 




Figure 2.  Basic Career Progression for an Officer in the Submarine Community 
Table 28 gives the monthly break down of a submarine officer’s monthly pay. 
The base-pay reflects the 2013 pay charts that were approved by Congress on May 24, 
2012. Base-pay is uniform for all military members regardless of branch of service. Basic 
Allowance for Housing (BAH) is based on the officer’s pay-grade, zip-code, and 
dependency status. The values in Table 28 represent an officer in the year 2012 who does 
not have any dependents and lives in Monterey, CA where the Naval Postgraduate School 
is located. Basic Allowances for Subsistence (BAS) is intended to cover basic food and 
subsistence cost. BAS was established on January 1, 2012 and is uniform across all pay-
grades. Continuous Submarine Incentive Pay (CONSUBPAY) was updated on September 
21, 2011. Sub pay is designed to be paid to active duty naval service officers and enlisted 
personnel who engage in and remain in the submarine service on a career basis. The main 
difference between a submarine officer’s pay and a SWO (N) is a SWO (N) does not 
receive CONSUBPAY. Instead surface officers receive sea pay, which is not included in 
Table 28 because it is based off of number of years an officer has been out to sea. The 
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value used for the number of years an officer has been out to sea could vary greatly based 
on each officer’s career. To calculate base-pay and CONSUBPAY the following 
assumptions were made about each officer’s years of commissioned service (YCS): an O-
6 has at least 22 YCS, an O-5 has at least 16 YCS, an O-4 has at least 10 YCS, and O-3 
has at least 4 YCS, an O-2 has at least 2 YCS, and an O-1 has less than 2 YCS. The 
charts used to calculate the values in Table 28 and 29 can be found in the Appendix.  
Table 28.    Monthly Breakdown of Submarine Officer Pay 
Paygrade Base-pay BAH w/o 
dependents
BAS CONSUBPAY Total 
O-6 $9,781 $2,943.00 $239.96 $835 $13,798.96 
O-5 $7,895 $2,715.00 $239.96 $835 $11,684.96 
O-4 $6,528 $2,574.00 $239.96 $705 $10,046.96 
O-3 $5,117 $2,241.00 $239.96 $510 $8,107.96 
O-2 $3,774 $1,950.00 $239.96 $305 $6,268.96 
O-1 $2,876 $1,608.00 $239.96 $230 $4,953.96 
 
Table 29 takes the totals calculated in Table 28 and adds the additional cost for a 
submarine officer on a yearly basis. The yearly total was calculated by taking the 
monthly total and multiplying it by 12. The annual defense healthcare cost is the same 
that can be found in Table 30 from the Advanced Education and Competency 
Management office. Nuclear Career Annual Incentive Bonus (AIB) is found under the 
Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay Program. The AIB is a sum of money paid annually to 
nuclear-qualified officers who have completed their initial service requirement. O-1 and 
O-2 officers do not have AIB in Table 29 because these officers are still in their initial 
service obligation. Nuclear officers can also receive Continuation Pay (COPAY) which is 
not reflected in Table 29 because it is only paid to officers who agree to remain on active 
duty for an additional three to seven years beyond their existing service obligation. An 
officer who signs up for initial COPAY agreement for three years receives $17,500 per 
year. Each additional COPAY agreement the officer makes past the initial three years 
earns another $30,000 per year. 
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O-6 $13,798.96 $165,587 $  6,405 $12,000 $184,492 
O-5 $11,684.96 $140,219 $  6,405 $12,000 $159,124 
O-4 $10,046.96 $120,563 $  6,405 $12,000 $139,468 
O-3 $8,107.96 $97,295 $  6,405 $12,000 $116,200 
O-2 $6,268.96 $75,227 $  6,405 None $81,632 
O-1 $4,953.96 $59,447 $  6,405 None $65,852 
 
 Table 30 is from the Advanced Education and Competency Management Office 
used for Manpower Management programming to reflect the annual cost, designated by 
the Navy, for  officers to attend graduate school under one of the fully funded programs.  










O-6 $207,847 $6,405 $214,252 
O-5 $173,318 $6,405 $179,723 
O-4 $149,244 $6,405 $155,649 
O-3 $124,334 $6,405 $130,739 
O-2 $99,190 $6,405 $105,595 
O-1 $78,317 $6,405 $84,722 
  
 If the officer attends graduate school under a fully funded program as an O-3 he 
will cost the Navy $130,739 FY-13 dollars per year. If the officer attends the same 
program as an O-4, he will cost the Navy $155,649. There would also be additional cost 
accrued by the Navy if the officer had a family, because an officer’s base-pay and basic 
housing allowance and health care cost increase with each additional dependent. If an 
officer is an O-3 or O-4 he has a much higher probability of having dependents, however 
the only cost that will come out of the graduate education fund is for the officer. For 
programs that are not funded by the Navy such as Civilian Funded Scholarship, Olmsted, 
and Officer Scholarship, the cost from Table 29 are used. The GEV program also uses the 
base cost from Table 29 and then adds an additional $40,000 to the base cost. Table 31 
 52
breaks down the service obligation required for the officer to complete after finishing his 
graduate degree and  the average cost for an officer to attend graduate school in each of 
the programs based on the information in Tables 29 and 30.  
Table 31.   Average Cost of Graduate Programs 
Scholarship 
Program Duration JPME 
Service 
Obligation  Total Cost 
VGEP 1 year 1 course No additional $84,722 (O-1) 
IGEP 1 year None No additional $84,722 (O-1) 
Civilian Funded 1 year None No additional $65,852 (O-1) 
Burke 2 years None Maximum 3 years 
$311,298 (O-4) 
$261,478 (O-3) 
Olmsted 2 years None 3 years    $278,937 (O-4)    $232,401 (O-3) 
GEV Max of 2 years None Maximum 3 years 
   $278,937 (O-4) 
   $232,401 (O-3) 
+ maximum of 
$40,000 
Officer 
Scholarship Max of 2 years None 
Maximum 3 
years 
   $278,937 (O-4) 
   $232,401 (O-3) 
Fully Funded Max of 2 years On-site Maximum 3 years 
$311,298 (O-4) 
$261,478 (O-3) 
LEAD 1 year On-site 2 DH Tours $261,478 (O-3) 
  
An officer sent to graduate school later in his career will cost the Navy more 
because he is paid more due to his rank and he will generally need more time at school to 
complete refresher courses before beginning the graduate curriculum. The refresher 
courses allow the officer to be adequately prepared for the course load required to 
complete his Master’s degree program. However, there is not only an additional monetary 
cost amassed by the Navy for an officer to be sent to graduate school later in his career, 
there is also an opportunity cost. The opportunity cost that the Navy will suffer is the loss 
of an officer available to fill a shore billet where operational experience and nuclear 
training is necessary. There are multiple shore billets that require the nuclear training and 
experience an O-3 and O-4 have earlier in his or her career that an O-1 will not have 




   Utilizing logistic regression, the data shows that, once the selection bias is 
removed from the data by conditioning the selection of officers to only those that attained 
the rank of LCDR (O-4), receiving a master’s degree during the first five years of his 
career is associated with a higher probability of remaining in the Navy until he reaches 
command than an officer who got his master’s after five years of commissioned service.   
There are three main differences that must be taken into consideration: money, service 
obligation, and the likelihood the officer will remain in the Navy until he reaches O-5. 
The majority of the scholarship programs offered after five years of commissioned 
service allow officers two years to complete graduate school. If you only compare the 
cost of a single year of graduate education for an officer who receives his master’s in the 
first five years versus later in his career he will cost the Navy on average $50,000 to 
$70,000 less per officer, as seen in Table 31, than an officer who earns his master’s 
degree later in his career. If you compare the total cost of an officer receiving his 
master’s in the first five years compared to later in his career, the officer who received his 
master’s degree in the first five years costs the Navy on average $180,000 to $200,000 
less. Also, the service obligation assumed if the officer earned his Master during his JO 
Shore Tour would be fulfilled during his DH Sea Tour, and if the officer earned his 
Master during his DH Shore Tour his obligation would be fulfilled during his Sea Tour as 
an Executive Officer. An officer must receive his master’s degree after ten years of 
commissioned service for his service obligation to affect the goals of the nuclear 
community.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In the nuclear community, officers must have their master’s degree before they 
can promote to CDR (O-5), which is at approximately 16 years of commissioned service. 
However, this community has a goal for all of its officers to get their master’s degree 
before their sea tour as an Executive Officer, which is at approximately 12 years of 
commissioned service. This gives the officers in the nuclear community three 
opportunities to earn a master’s degree. There are three problems that arise for the 
nuclear community during the window of opportunity to send its officers as LT and 
LCDR to get his or her master’s degree. First, it costs the Navy substantially more 
financially and operationally to send an officer who is of a higher rank. Second, there are 
multiple billets that need officers who are nuclear qualified that these officers are 
required to fill during his or her JO and DH Shore tours. Third, the officer loses the 
opportunity to use the degree throughout his career the later he is sent to graduate school. 
This thesis used a logistic regression model to determine the correlation between 
an officer receiving his master’s degree and how likely he is to remain in the Navy until 
the rank of CDR (O-5). In order to control selection bias the first model conditioned on 
the officers having been in the nuclear community as a commissioned officer for at least 
ten years. In this model the timing of when an officer received his master’s degree was 
insignificant. However, the next model conditioned on the officers remaining in the 
nuclear community until the rank of LCDR (O-4) found that the officer who received his 
master’s in the first five years of his career was more likely to remain in the Navy and 
earn the rank of CDR than an officer who received his master’s after five years of 
commissioned service. This finding is important because it shows that of the officers who 
attain the rank of LCDR, the individuals who earned their graduate degree earlier in their 
career have a greater likelihood of remaining in the Navy to earn the rank of CDR. 
Since a logistic regression model that did not remove officers who left the nuclear 
community before LCDR could not give significant results due to selection bias, this 
thesis focused on the officers who were removed for the model conditioned on remaining 
in the nuclear community until LCDR. The focus on the officer removed from the LCDR 
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model does not give reason to change policy. However, an interesting finding is that 44% 
of the officers who earned their master’s after five years and did not remain in the Navy 
was due to misconduct, unsatisfactory performance, or failure to promote compared to 
10% of the officers who earned their master’s in the first five years of their career. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
To improve this study in the future, the main change would be to get data from 
the Officer Promotion History File and Officer Master Record Files maintained at the 
Defense Manpower Data Center in Monterey, CA. The ODIS system failed to label 
which graduate program 83% the officers participated in. In order to get a more accurate 
cost-benefit estimation for each program, we need to know which program the officer 
participated in. By knowing the program each officer participated in, we will better 
understand the most cost effective way to get as many officers to graduate school before 
they reach LCDR. This can be done by making the program the officer participated in a 
variable within the logistic regression model similar to the variable explained in Chapter 
IV “Navy Scholarship.” The results from the logistic regression would identify which 
graduate programs do or do not improve an officer’s likelihood of remaining in the Navy 
until the rank of CDR. The most cost-effective program would be a program that cost the 
Navy the least and improves the likelihood that an officer remains in the Navy until the 
rank of CDR. 
Also, there are multiple ways the data could be expanded to give a more detailed 
representation of the nuclear community. The data set could be extended until year-group 
1999 if the focus is for officers to get their degree before they become an Executive 
Officer (12-year mark) or year-group 1996 if the focus is for officers to make it to CDR 
(O-5). This would allow for women to be in the data-set. Since women are not included 
in this data set there is no evidence to observe if women’s behavior deviate from the 
trends observed in this study. To find what effects an officer’s decision to leave the 
nuclear community before a certain point, some demographic variable could be added to 
the model such as whether or not the officer has children, is married, his age upon 
commissioning, and the number of months he has been deployed. By finding the officer 
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who is most likely to remain in the nuclear community until CDR (O-5), the community 
will be more affective at choosing candidates to attend graduate school that will benefit 
the overall mission since there are only a limited number of officers that can be sent. 
Observing demographic trends will also show what changes could be made in the nuclear 
community to retain more officers.  
B. TAKEAWAYS 
To observe officers over their complete career, one might want to use Survival 
Analysis. Type I right censoring could be used to observe if the officers remain in the 
nuclear community to a certain year point, either 12 years to make it to Executive Officer 
or 16 years to make it to commander. Type I left censoring observes what happens after 
the 12- or 16-year mark similar to the logistic regression used in this study. Type II 
censoring in Survival Analysis could be used by observing the number of times an officer 
promotes. This different approach would eliminate the problem of having to remove a 
large group of data points to control for selection bias. 
The model conditioned on an officer earning the rank of LCDR shows evidence 
that  going to graduate school in the first five years makes an officer more likely to 
promote to O-5. Based on these findings, it is important to keep educating officers early 
in their careers. This will allow the Navy to get the optimal benefit of specialty code and 
graduate degree. It also allows for more officers that have a wealth of operational 
knowledge and nuclear training to fill the shore billets that require nuclear training. There 
is no substantial evidence to encourage a drastic change because such a large group of 
officers had to be removed from the data set to control for selection bias. Removing a 
large number of observations is a concern because when looking at the complete data set 
77% of the officers who earned their master’s early did not remain in the Navy until 
LCDR. Also when observing the data points that were removed from the LCDR model, 
44% of the officers who earned their master’s after five years were forced to leave the 
Navy due to unsatisfactory performance, misconduct, or failure to promote, whereas only 
10% of the individuals that received their masters in the first five years of their career 
were forced to leave the Navy.  
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The analysis completed in this thesis provides evidence to suggest that educating 
officers early in their careers is positively correlated with retention and promotion to the 
rank of CDR. However, we cannot directly link a cause/effect relationship to graduate 
education and officer retention, because the officers selected for early graduate education 
may have the predisposition to stay in the Navy regardless of the education due to the 
selection process. This impact of graduate education is an especially important finding 
during this time of budget cuts because sending an officer in the nuclear pipeline to 
graduate school early in their career will cost the Navy the least amount possible 
monetarily and allow for these officers to use their operational experience to fill key 
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